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Abstract 
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This paper looks at the question of adequacy of reserves in sub-Saharan African countries in 
light of  the shocks faced by these countries. Literature on optimal reserves so far has not 
paid attention to the particular shocks facing low-income countries. We use a two-good 
endowment economy model facing terms of trade and aid shocks to derive the optimal level 
of reserves by comparing the cost of holding reserves with their benefits as an insurance 
against a shock. We find that the optimal level of reserves depends upon the size of these 
shocks, their probability, and the output cost associated with them,.   
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Policy makers in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), as elsewhere, often need to find an operational 
way to assess reserve adequacy. Assessing adequacy needs to be viewed in the broader 
context of macroeconomic policies. A specific level of reserves may be adequate when 
alternative sources of financing exist or adjustment can be quickly attained. The same level 
of reserves, however, may not be adequate if there are no alternative sources of financing, no 
exchange rate instrument, and/or there is a reluctance or inability to correct a current account 
deficit. In addition, a large number of economic fundamentals, besides international reserves, 
can amplify the impact of adverse shocks and render a country crisis-prone in the event of a 
shock. These include risky short-term financing structures; stock imbalances due to maturity, 
currency, and interest rate mismatches; and high leverages in public and private sector 
balance sheets. 
Recent studies have attempted to assess reserve adequacy by weighing the consumption 
smoothing benefits of holding reserves against their cost (Aizenman and Lee, 2005, Garcia 
and Soto, 2004, and Jeanne and Ranciere, 2006). Jeanne and Ranciere (2006) consider a 
small open economy with a single good consumed domestically and abroad. The economy is 
vulnerable to sudden stops in capital flows from abroad. Reserves allow the country to 
smooth domestic absorption in response to sudden stops, but yield a lower return than the 
interest. They come up with a closed form, analytical solution for the optimal level of reserve 
holdings under the above mentioned assumptions and apply it to industrial and emerging 
market countries. They find that under plausible calibrations the model can explain reserves 
of the magnitude observed in many industrial and emerging countries.  
SSA countries, however, are routinely faced with substantially different shocks than 
industrial and emerging market economies. These shocks include abrupt changes in the terms 
of trade and aid flows, which can contribute to higher volatility in aggregate output and, in 
extreme cases, to economic crisis. Recent reserve models of consumption smoothing do not 
tend to take into account exogenous shocks such as changes in terms of trade and aid flows 
that affect most developing countries.  
To address these issues, this paper extends the Jeanne and Ranciere (2006) reserve model of 
consumption smoothing and applies it to simulate reserve holdings in SSA in light of likely 
shocks. We extend the model in two ways. First, we have two goods in the economy – one 
traded and another non-traded, with exogenous shocks to the relative price of the traded 
good, or the terms of trade. Second, every period the economy receives a stochastic transfer 
of traded good, called aid. We use this extended model to simulate the level of reserves the 
economy described by our model would hold and contrast it with actual holdings of SSA 
countries. 
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The country simulations considered here take into account various aspects of vulnerability. 
Standard indicators consider financing needs (reserves/imports) and elements of balance 
sheet vulnerabilities (reserves/money and reserves/short-term external debt). Some of the 
LIC-specific indicators take into account many of the factors, notably the cost and risk of 
shocks and the interest cost of financing reserve holdings. The use of a small open economy 
two-goods model allows us to simulate the optimal level of reserves across a broad spectrum 
of shocks and output costs, but the “optimal level” of reserves is sensitive to the choice of 
key parameters such as the risk aversion, the term premium and the probability of shocks, 
and results in the paper are illustrative of model simulations for a given set of parameters.  
However, they leave many key considerations out. Inevitably, then, their application requires 
judgment. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides some background on the currently 
used measures of foreign reserve adequacy in Sub-Saharan African countries. Section III 
focuses on the specific shocks faced by SSA countries and their impact on some key 
macroeconomic variables. Section IV presents the basic model used for simulations that 
takes in to account these shocks. Simulation results from the model are presented in Section 
V. Section VI presents concluding remarks.   
II.   FOREIGN RESERVES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
A.   The State of Play  
Foreign reserves for all of SSA are reached an all time high of US$127 billion in 2007. Over 
the past 10 years fast reserve accumulation by oil exporters and steady accumulation by 
South Africa are notable. This reflects low initial reserve holdings, increasing openness of 
SSA economies, and a policy choice to build precautionary levels to insure against balance of 
payment risks. Other SSA countries have kept reserves roughly stable as a share of imports 
(see Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Reserves in Months of Imports1 
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Traditional measures suggest reserve levels vary greatly across countries and country 
groupings (See Figures 2 and 3). 
• Current account-based measures—gross official reserves in months of imports—are 
particularly useful for SSA countries, as an indication of how rapidly countries would 
need to adjust to shocks. At end-2007, reserves covered 5.8 months of imports, up 
from 3.7 months in 1997-2002. This reflects a wide range across countries, though, 
with above average cover in oil exporting countries and below average cover in 
fragile countries. 
• Since some of the countries in the region are also subject to potential capital outflows, 
capital account-based measures of reserve adequacy are important too. The ratio of 
reserves to short term debt, especially relevant for countries that face risks related to 
short-term external financing, was less than 1 for only a handful of countries.  
Reserve levels of other regions offer yardsticks for comparison. Reserve levels for the SSA 
as a whole are lower than those for the Middle East and North Africa where reserves have 
served as a store of value in resource rich countries, but higher than those of developing 
countries in general (Table 1). But with structural changes affecting balance of payments 
flows and the diverse macroeconomic settings and vulnerabilities of different countries, the 
experience of other regions provide only limited guidance for SSA countries about the 
adequate level of reserves in future.1 Also, many countries may accumulate reserves as a 
side- effect of monetary and exchange rate policies, such as efforts to stem real exchange rate 
appreciation. In this case, the observed level of reserves is no benchmark for adequacy. 
 
1995-04 2005 2006 2007 1995-04 2005 2006 2007 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 3.5 4.6 5.3 5.2 2.8 4.2 4.8 5.8 
Middle East And North Africa 8.5 10.9 11.8 11.7 3.1 3.5 3.9 4.0 
Emerging Asia 5.8 8.0 8.6 9.0 2.5 3.8 4.3 4.8 
Other Developing Asia 1
  
8.3 11.2 12.3 12.3 3.4 4.1 4.6 4.7 
Western Hemisphere   3.4 4.6 5.0 5.5 2.1 7.1 9.2 10.9 
Developing Countries 4.3 4.2 3.8 3.5 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.3 
Emerging Market Economies 6.7 8.9 9.1 9.4 8.1 8.4 8.7 9.6 
Least Developed 
Countries 6.0 7.9 8.2 8.5 3.7 5.0 5.4 5.9 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook.
1  Excluding China & India.
In Months of Imports Ratio to Short Term Debt 
Table 1. Comparisons of International Reserves Across Regions, 1995-07 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 For the CFA zone countries, for instance, the creation of a regional financial market with the possibility of 
emission of domestic-currency-denominated treasury bonds may help smoothing consumption. 
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1 Imports of Goods and Services
Figure 2.  Reserves in Sub-Saharan African Countries, 2007
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III.   SHOCKS FACING SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
Countries in SSA face substantially different shocks compared to industrial and emerging 
market countries. The main shocks facing low income countries in Africa are: a sharp change 
in their terms of trade due to exogenous movements in the prices of  key exports/imports and 
a change in the net aid flows (defined as Net Official Development Assistance Grants less 
Food and Technical assistance) received by them.  
For the purposes of our analysis we define shocks in terms of annual percentage changes in 
terms of trade or aid flows facing a country. To further capture the idea of `large changes’ we 
define a terms of trade shock as an year on year decline in the terms of trade index larger 
than 10 percent in absolute terms. Similarly, an aid shock is defined as a decline in the net aid 
inflow of 50 percent or more in absolute terms. These thresholds are based on the probability 
distribution of the two shocks so that such events happen 20-25 percent of the time for an 
average SSA country2 (Figures 4 and 5) 
Eighty percent of the SSA countries face a 10 percent or larger negative terms of trade shock 
at least 5 percent of the time or more while 80 percent of these countries face a 50 percent or 
larger decline in aid flow at least 5 percent of the time or more. The average size of a terms 
of trade shock in SSA countries is 21 percent while the average size of aid shock is 181 
percent (roughly 4-5 percent of GDP). Average probability of a terms of trade shock as 
defined above, in SSA countries, is about 20 percent and that of an aid shock is 10 percent. 
 
                                                 
2 Exploring the sensitivity of these results to the precise threshold values can be interesting future work.   
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Figure 4. Frequency Distributions of Key Parameters 
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The loss in output and consumption due to such shocks can be significant, especially for 
countries with low levels of foreign reserves. The average loss in output, as measured by the 
reduction in GDP growth following a shock, associated with a 10 percent or larger terms of 
trade shock is 1.5 percent (based on the sample)3. Same is true for the output loss associated 
with an aid shock of 50 percent or more. About 40 percent of aid shocks are associated with 
an output cost lying between 0.5 to 4 percent and another 20 percent with an output loss 
between 5-6  percent. About 40 percent of the terms of trade shocks are associated with 
output cost of 2 percent or more. 
However, the actual response of output and consumption to a shock varies significantly with 
the level of reserve holdings of a country. Countries with a high level of reserves to GDP 
ratio (those in the top 25th percentile) showed very little effect of a terms of trade or aid 
shock on their output and consumption. On the other hand, countries with low reserves to 
GDP ratio (bottom 25th percentile) showed a significant decline in their output growth and an 
even more dramatic decline in their per capita consumption. 
 
                                                 
3 Other variables, such as exchange rate and fiscal stance might determine the cost of the shocks and reserve 
accumulation and there is possibility of some endogeneity between aid shocks and output falls. A thorough 
empirical analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Figure 5. Frequency Distributions of Key Parameters 
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Figures 6 and 7 provide some evidence on the response of absorption, output, and foreign 
reserves to large terms-of-trade and aid shocks over the period 1980-2006. We classify 
countries as ‘Low-Reserve’ (LR henceforth) or ‘High Reserve’ (HR henceforth) based on 
their average reserve-to-GDP ratio during 2000-06. Of the 44 SSA countries, eleven 
countries whose average reserve-to-GDP ratio was in the bottom 25th percentile were called 
LR countries. Overall average reserve to GDP ratio for this group during this period was 4.2 
percent.  
Countries in the HR group had an average reserve to GDP ratio higher than 16 percent during 
2000-06 and the overall average for the period was about 28 percent ( 7 times more than that 
for LR countries). 
We then identify the ‘shocks’, as defined in the beginning, for these countries over a period 
of 27 years (1980-2006).4 Next we look at the behavior of GDP growth, domestic absorption  
(defined as domestic consumption plus gross capital investment per capita.) and foreign 
                                                 
4 The frequency distribution of shocks  may have changed over the period  reflecting changes in the patterns of 
aid and terms-of-trade shocks.  
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reserves over a five-year `event’ window centered around the shock occurring at time zero. 
This is done for aid and terms of trade shocks separately. Events that occur inside the five-
year window of the previous shock episode are excluded. The solid lines in the panels are the 
path of these variable in response to a terms of trade / aid shock while the broken lines give 
the one standard error band. 
Looking at the top column in Figure 6 we can see that LR countries face a more significant 
decline in their GDP growth due to a terms of trade shock as compared to the HR countries. 
The difference is even more striking when it comes to the response of per capita absorption. 
For LR countries growth in per capita absorption declines significantly (it is in fact negative 
for one year after the shock) and does not return to the pre-shock level even after 2 years. On 
the other hand there is no significant change in domestic absorption for HR countries in 
response to a large TOT shock. It appears that countries with a higher level of reserves are 
better able to cushion the effect of a shock by utilizing their reserves in the event of a shock. 
Last column of the same panel, which plots the movement in reserves as a percentage of 
GDP around the shock, gives some evidence to support this view. Both LR and HR countries 
accumulate reserves during ‘normal’ times (i.e. before the shock) and draw down these 
reserves during a TOT shock (as shown by a fall in reserve level at time zero). However, 
while this fall in reserves amounts to about 1 percent of GDP for LR countries, for HR 
countries this reduction amounts to roughly 1.6 percent of their GDP. Looking at the 
cumulative reduction in reserves over the two years starting with the shock, the reduction in 
reserves for LR countries is only 0.98 percent while it is about 3 percent for HR countries.   
Clearly it is more difficult for LR countries to cushion their output and consumption in the 
event of a shock. In fact, unlike HR countries which continue to draw down their reserves for 
another year after the shock the LR countries are seen to start building their reserves 
immediately after the shock. One potential reason for this may be that with already low level 
of reserves, LR countries can not draw down on these any further without inducing panic in 
the domestic and international financial markets and thereby increasing the risk of an 
economic crisis.  
Looking at the case of a large aid `shock’ we find similar results. Output and domestic 
absorption are affected more in case of LR countries except that in this case the decline in 
domestic absorption occurs one year after the shock. This may reflect the difference between 
the timing of disbursement and utilization of aid proceeds. Also, as was the case with a terms 
of trade shock, absorption is affected more severely than output indicating the role of 
consumption smoothing. To the best of our knowledge the empirical evidence provided 
above has not been recorded anywhere else and exploring the relationship between the level 
of reserve holdings and response of key macro-economic variables would be a fruitful area of 
future research. 
To sum up, SSA countries are routinely faced with abrupt changes in the terms of trade and 
aid flows, which have contributed to higher volatility in aggregate output and, in extreme 
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cases, to economic crisis. Assessing the adequacy of reserves, thus, requires understanding 
the role of reserves in smoothing domestic absorption in response to external shocks, the 
object of the next section. 
Figure 6. Response of Key Macro Economic Variables to a Large TOT Shock 
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Source: Authors’ computations based on I.M.F, International Financial Statistics and World Bank, 
World Development Indicators. 
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Figure 7. Response of Key Macroeconomic Variables to a Large Aid Shock 
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IV.   SMALL OPEN ECONOMY WITH TWO GOODS 
Consider a Small Open Economy (SOE) with two goods—one tradable and another non-
tradable. The economy follows a deterministic path for the output of two goods, disturbed 
only by exogenous shocks to the terms of trade. Besides it gets a unilateral transfer of 
tradable good from abroad called “Aid” which grows at the same rate as output and is 
stochastic in nature. To elaborate further, a shock to the terms of trade is defined as a fall of 
ten percent or more in the terms of trade from the ‘normal’ level, which is set equal to one. 
Aid shock is also defined as an unforeseen drop in aid flows of five percent or more. In 
periods with no shocks, terms of trade and aid flow remain at their normal level. Probabilities 
of the two shocks are exogenously given as AidTOT ππ  and 
T T
t t t tC T Y Z A
 and the two shocks are 
independent of each other. When either of these shocks occur, two things happen – one, 
output growth falls below its ‘normal level’ and second, in the case of external private 
borrowing, there is not roll over of short-term private external debt. Thus, aid and T.O.T 
shocks are always accompanied by a ‘Sudden-Stop’ in capital. The domestic economy is 
composed of the private sector and the government. We present two cases: with and without 
private external borrowing.  
A.   No External Private Borrowing 
The representative private consumer is subject to the following budget constraints:  
  
 = × + +
N N
t tC Y=
T
tC
N
tC
T
tY
N
tY
tA broad 
 (1.1) 
 
  (1.2) 
 
Here  is the consumption of tradable good in period t and  is the consumption of non-
tradable good.  and  are the period t output of tradable and non-tradable goods 
respectively. T is the terms of trade.  is the unilateral transfer of tradable good from a
which is given directly to the representative private consumer and consumed in the same 
period. tZ  is t  transfer of tradable good by the government. In every period the 
consumption of non-tradable good is equal to its output (for simplicity we assume that the 
non-tradable good can not be saved). The consumption of tradable good on the other hand 
equals the sum of the output of tradable good, government transfer of tradable good and aid 
flow from abroad every period. 
he
  
Combining equations 1.1 and 1.2 we get the over budget constraint for the consumer, 
 
  (1.3) T N N T N Nt t t t t t t tC P C T Y Z A P Y+ × = × + + + ×
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N
tP  is the endogenously determined price of non-tradable good. Output of tradable as well as 
non-tradable good grows at the same constant rate `g’  until a terms of trade or aid shock 
occurs. The shock is associated with a fall in output by a fraction γ . After the shock the 
output goes back to its long-run path.   
 
Denoting the periods before, during and after the shock with the sub-scripts b, d  and a we 
can write the following equations summarizing our assumptions, 
 
  (1.4) , 0 , 0 , 0(1 ) ,  (1 )(1 ) ,  (1 )(1 )
T t T T t T T t T
t b t d t aY g Y Y g Y Y g Yγ γ= + = − + = − +
, 0 , 0 , 0(1 ) ,  (1 )(1 ) ,  (1 )(1 )
N t N N t N N t N
t b t d t aY g Y Y g Y Y g Yγ γ= + = − + = − +
( ) ( ( )( ), 0 , 0 , 01 ,  1 1 ,  1 1 tt b t d Aid a Aid
  (1.5) 
)( )t t tA g A A g Aγ= + = − = − +g A Aγ +  (1.6)  
 
The government can issue a long-term security that does not have to be repaid during the 
shock (there is just one long-term security though there are two shocks). The long-term 
security issued by the government is a bond that yields one unit of good in every period until 
the shock occurs. The security stops yielding any income after the shock.  
 
The pre-shock price of the security is equal to the present discounted value of the one unit of 
good it pays in the next period plus the expected market value of the security,  
 
( )1 1 1 sP Pπ= + −  .1 r δ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦+ +
 
Where sπ TOT Aid TOT Aidπ π π π= + − ×
r
 is the probability of a shock (to aid, terms of trade or 
both)  occurring in any period,  is the short term interest rate (equal to the discount rate of 
the representative consumer) and δ is the term premium. This implies, 
 
 1P
r sδ π= + +
t t
 (1.7) 
 
Equation 1.7 uses the fact that the price of the long-term security is constant before the 
sudden stop and falls to zero when sudden stop occurs. 
 
The government issues the long-term security to finance a stock of reserves, 
 
R PN =  (1.8) 
 
Where  is the number of securities issued by the government in period t. Government’s 
budget constraint is given by:  
tN
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( ) ( )1 1 11t t t t t tZ R N P N N r R − − −+ + = − + +  (1.9) 
ation 1.8 can be used to substitute out tN  and 1tN
 
Equ  from equation 1.9 to get the following −
expression,   
 ( )1 11bt t s tZ r R RP δ π− −
⎛ ⎞= − − = − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (1.10) 
Negative transfer implies that the government taxes the representative consumer in order to 
 and when ent on 
pay for the cost of carrying the reserves, which is proportional to the term premium plus the 
probability of a shock.  
 
If  the shock occurs, the government transfers the reserves (net of last paym
the long-term security) to help the representative consumer, 
 
( ) 11dt s tZ Rδ π −= − −  (1.11) 
fter the shock the governments become inactive and ,   and t t t
 
R N Z  are all equal to zero. 
 
A
Using equations 1.10 and 1.11 we can get the expressions for tradable consumption before
and after the shock, 
 
( ), , 1T Tt b t b s t tC T Y R Aδ π − × − + +  (1.12) =
( ), , 1(1 ) 1T Tt TOT TOT t d s t tC T Yγ δ π −= − × × + − − R A+  (1.13)  
( ) ( )1t Aid Aid tC T Aγ ×, , 11T Tt d s tY Rδ π −= × + − − + −
( )
 (1.14)  
( ) ( ) A×  (1.15) , , 1 1t TOT Aid Aid tRπ γ= − + −
, ,
T T
t a t a tC T Y A
,1 1
T T
TOT t d s tC T Yγ δ −× × + − − 
 = × +  (1.16) 
creas
 
ing 1tR −  raises the consumption of tradable good in period t if there is a shock and 
, 
, ,t b t a t aC Y C Y  (1.17) 
overnment chooses R so as to maximize the welfare of the representative consumer, 
( ) ( )0
0
1 ,st t s
s
U E r u C
∞ −
+
=
In
lowers it if there is no shock. Expression for the consumption of non-tradable is as follows
 
N N
, , , ,,  ,  
N N N N
t b t d t dC Y= = = 
 
 G
 
⎡ ⎤= + ⎣ ⎦∑  (1.18) 
here the flow utility function has a constan tive risk aversion 
 
W t rela σ , 
( )
 
1 σ 1
1
Cu C σ
− −= − , 
And C is the aggregate consumption, 
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( ) ( )1i T N, ,i t iC C Cα α−t t= ;  i b, TOT, Aid  = 
i
sC
substitution between the tradable
is the commonly used Cobb-Douglas c m on aggregator with constant elasticity of onsu pti
α  is the sh and the non-tradable goods and are of tradable 
good in total consum er is equal to the rate 
of 
ption. The discount rate of representative consum
interest r . This ensures that the consumer’s maximization problem is well defined in the 
absence of endogenous discount rate or upward sloping interest rate function. Since tR  only 
affects the level of consumption in the next period, government’s problem is to choose the 
level of tR  n each period that maximizes the level of expected utility ( )1tu C +  next period.  
 
( )( )
i
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
TOT
Aid TOT Aid tu Cπ π π+ − × ×
 
The first order condition for the problem
 
( )( )
( ) ( )
0 1 1 1
,
arg max arg max(1 ) b TOTt t s t TOT Aid t
Aid TOT Aid
R E u C u C u Cπ π π π+ + += = − × + − × ×⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
1 1TOT Aid tu Cπ π+ ++ × ×
 is, 
( )
) ( )
( )
'
1
'
1
'
1
1
1
b
s s T t
TOT
TOT Aid T t
Aid
T t
u C
u C
u C
π δ π
π π
+
+
+
− +
( TOTπ⎡
 ( ) ( )
' ,
s Aid TOT Aid
TOT A
δ π π π π
π π
⎤× ×−⎢ ⎥⎢
( )1 idTOT Aid T tu C +
⎥= − − + − × ×⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥+ × ×⎣ ⎦
 (1.19) 
serves cond
on a shock. The lef arginal cost 
of reserves conditional on there bein vel of reserves is chosen 
ptimally, the marginal utility of hold es is equal to the marginal cost of holding 
d 
ption in the absence of a shock by 
 
The right-hand side of equation 1. itional 19 is the expected marginal utility of re
t-hand side is the probability of no shock times the expected m
g no shock. When the le
ing reservo
them.  
 
Denoting the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in the event of a shock an
consum tp we can write, 
 
( )
( )
'
0
'
d
T t
t b
E u C
p
E u C0 T t
⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
(1.20) 
Where `d’ denotes `during the shock’. Equation 1.20 says that when reserves are set 
optimally, this price should be constant and equal to, 
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1 1
1 1
s
s
p
s
δ π
δ π δ π
+= = −− − −     − (1.21) 
e Notations, 
 
Som
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
, ,
1
, ,
1,
, , , ,
1
, ,
,
,
TOT T N
t t TOT t TOT
Aid T N
t t Aid t Aid
TOT Aid T N
t t TOT Aid t TOT Aid
b T N
t t b t b
C C C
C C C
C C C
C C C
α α
α α
α α
α α
−
−
−
−
=
=
=
=
 (1.22) 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1, ,TOT T NTOT TOT Aid t t TOT t TOTC C Cσ α απ π π − − −⎡ ⎤− × ×⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) )
1 1'
0 , ,
1 1
, ,
d Aid T N
T t Aid TOT Aid t t Aid t Aid
Aid
E u C C C C
C
σ α α
α
α π π π − − −
−
⎡ ⎤ = + − × ×⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (1.23) 
And, 
( ) ( )( , , ,TOT Aid T NTOT Aid t t TOT Aid t TOTC Cσ απ π − −+ × ×
  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1,T Nt bC'0 ,1b bT t s t t bE u C C Cσ α α−   (1.24) 
values of parameters and shocks.  
 
B.   External Private Borrowing 
 allow private external borrowing. We assume that the 
presentative agent can engage in short-term borrowing from abroad and that the short-term 
external debt (which 
α π − −⎡ ⎤ = − ×⎣ ⎦
 
equations 1.21, 1.22, 1.23 and 1.24 we can simulate the optimal level of reserves for different 
We modify the above framework to
re
is a fraction λ  of  tradable good output) grows at the same rate as 
output until a shock occurs. This debt has to be repaid in terms of tradable good even when 
he there is a shock to the terms of trade or aid, with an interest rate r . There is no default. In t
event of a shock the agent repays its outstanding external debt but can not engage in fresh 
borrowing during or after the shock (no debt roll over). This assumption is necessary for 
keeping the reserve management problem meaningful since without the no-debt-roll-over 
condition private agent will be able to smooth over its consumption by engaging in external 
borrowing. These assumptions can be expressed as follows, 
 
 0(1 ) ,  0
b t T d a
t t tL g T Y L Lλ= + × = =  (1.25
 
) 
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Consumption of tradable good in each period is equal to,  
 
( )1T TY L r L Z= × + − + + +1t t t t t tC T A−  
Thus, the expression for tradab ption before, during and after a shock is, 
 
 
 
 
le good consum
( ) ( ), , 11T Tt b t b t t sC T Y L r L δ π= × + − + − + 1t tR A− − +  (1.26) 
 ( ) ( ), , 1 1(1 ) 1 1T Tt TOT TOT t d t s t tC T Y r L R Aγ δ π− −= − × × − + + − − +  (1.27) 
( ) ( ) ( ) tA×  (1.28) , , 11 1T Tt d t s tY r L Rδ π−= × − + + − − 1 1t Aid AidC T γ− + −
( )
 
( ) ( ) ( )id tA, , , 1 11 1 1 1t TOT Aid TOT t d t s t AC T Y r L Rγ δ π− −T T γ= − × × − + + − − + −
, ,
T T
t a t a tC T Y A
×  (1.29)  
 = × +
g these modified expressions in equations 1.22, 1.23 and 1.24 will give us 
serves with short term external borrowing. 
 (1.30) 
eplacin
vel of re
s does not allow for an analytical 
lution. We therefore u al reserves as a 
function of output. Simu 5. 
eter values have b countries. Average size of a 
terms of trade ‘shock’ ac cent while that of an aid shock 
 
R optimal 
le
 
V.   SIMULATION RESULTS 
he two-good model presented in the above paragraphT
so se numerical techniques to solve for the level of optim
lation results presented below assume external private borrowing
 
A.   Choice of Parameters 
able A.1 gives the value of key parameters used for benchmark simulations. These T
param een calibrated using data for 44 SSA 
ross SSA countries was about 21 per
was 1.8 percent (4-5 percent of GDP). These were used to calibrate TOTγ  and Aidγ . Sim
average probabilities of a terms of trade shock and an aid shock were used to calibrate TOT
ilarly 
π  
and Aidπ  respectively. Aid as a share of G.D.P is equal to 4 percent (equal to a age aid to 
GDP ratio for the 44 SSA countries between (1975-2005). Output cost of term
aid shocks, 1
ver
s of trade and 
γ  and 2γ , were calibrated based on the impulse responses discussed in section 
III. Potential output growth, g, is set to be 5 percent based on the average growth rate for 
Africa over last 5 years. Share of short term debt in GDP, λ , was again calibrated using 
country-specific data for the 44 SSA countries for 2007.  Risk free short-term rate of return, 
r, is set at 5 percent – same as the federal funds rate during 1987-2005. Term premium, δ , 
                                                 
5 An interesting future extension would be to look at a case where there is no private external borrowing. 
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which reflects the cost of holding reserves, is set at 1.5 perc nt. This is equal to the value 
used by Jeanne and Ranciere (2005). One can argue that the cost of holding foreign reserves 
is higher in low-income African countries than in emerging market countries and therefore 
the term premium should be slightly higher for these countries. This value is also likely to 
differ across countries, and if available, country specific term-premia should be used. The 
remaining parameters are obtained from other low-income country studies. 
 
 
B.   Jeanne-Ranciere and the Two-Good Model 
e
 this sectio  the Two-
ood m
oses of 
 
In n we compare the results from Jeanne-Ranciere model with those from
ake the comparison meaningful we do not incorporate aid shocks as of yet G odel. To m
in the Two-Good mod for the purpel. In fact, we assume aid flows to be equal to zero 
this exercise. In effect there is just one shock which takes a different interpretation in the case
of a Two-Good model and has a direct effect on the level of  tradable income. Figure 8 plots 
the level of optimal reserves (expressed as a percentage of G.DP.) against key parameters for 
both the models (remaining parameters are kept constant and same across the two models). 
For both the models the level of optimal reserves increases with the probability and the 
output cost of the shock and declines with the term premium δ . Optimal level of reserves 
also go up with the size of  terms of trade shock in case of the Two-Good model. However, 
for relevant ranges of the key parameters , the Two-Good model suggests a higher level 
optimal reserves when compared to the Ranciere model.    
 
To understand these results we look at the key differences between the Ranciere model and  
the two-goods model. Firstly, the Two-Good model allows us to take in to account the direc
ffect of a fall in the terms of trade on the ability of the developing coun
of 
t 
try to import tradable 
ut (and consumption), but reserves can only be used to cushion the 
 
sumption and total utility is ha
e
goods. This can be called as the – ‘direct income effect’ of a fall in the relative price of a 
country’s exports.  
Second, return to an additional dollar of reserves in terms of non-shock dollar is lower in the 
model with two-goods. This is because a terms of trade shock affects both non-tradable an
tradable goods outp
d 
r words, 
decline in tradable goods consumption and a lower non-tradable consumption implies a lower
marginal utility of tradable consumption.  
Finally, the substitution of tradable consumption between shock and non-shock states is 
easier in the case of the two-goods model, since tradable goods only account for half the total 
consumption (its impact on the overall con lf). In othe
the return, in terms of utility, to having an additional dollar in reserves and hence having 
smaller variation in the tradable goods consumption before and during the shock is smaller 
when compared to the case with a single good which is also used for accumulating reserves. 
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While the first point implies a higher optimal level of reserves in the two-goods model, the 
last two points imply a lower level of optimal reserves. For the relevant range of key 
parameters in question the first effect dominates the last two effects and hence the optimal 
f trade 
 
 
 
 
1 Broken line shows the results for Jeanne-Ranciere while the solid line shows the Two-Good model. 
2 Optimal Reserves are expressed as a percentage of output. 
 
ck of average size at time zero 
ls 
level of reserves as a share of output is higher in the model with two goods. This in turn 
implies that under the benchmark parameters, the fall in consumption due to a terms o
shock would be smaller in the two-goods model. For the set of benchmark parameters given
in Table A .1, the Two-Good Model suggests an optimal level of reserve that is greater by
about 2 percent of GDP than the one suggested by the Ranciere model. 
 
Figure 8. Optimal Reserve Behavior – Jeanne-Ranciere vs. Two-Good Model 1,2
 
Figure 9 below shows the path of  consumption (expressed as a percentage of GDP in the 
year before the shock) in the event of a terms of trade sho
when optimal reserves are chosen under the two-goods model. We compare it with the path 
under the Ranciere model for illustrative purposes. In the one-good model consumption fal
by about 4 percent whereas it falls by only 1.5 percent in the case of the two-goods model.  
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Clearly, for countries facing exogenous shocks such as a terms-of-trade fall, it is important to 
take in to account those shocks while assessing the adequacy of their reserve holdings. 
 
Figure 9. Path of Consumption - Ranciere vs. Two-Good Model 
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C.   Adding Aid Shocks to the Framework 
In this section w ent the results for the 
full model. The two shocks in the model occur independently of each other. We use this 
 
s with the output cost associated with each shock. 
Along with the actual size of the shock, the output loss associated with each shock 
e 
f 
e add the aid shocks to our Two-Good model and pres
assumption to make calculations simple since there is empirical evidence to show that the 
two shocks are uncorrelated (Dhasmana, 2007). Figures 10 and 11 show the results from the  
complete model. As before, the optimal level of reserves increases with the probability and
size of terms of trade and aid shock. A higher probability of shock implies a higher expected 
loss in the utility due to the shock and therefore a higher optimal level of reserves. Similar 
argument holds for the case of size of shocks. Since the loss of consumption that a country 
will have to face in the event of a shock is directly related to the actual size of the shock, a 
country which is subject to large movements in its terms of trade or aid flows, should 
optimally hold a larger stock of reserves.  
The optimal level of reserves also increase
determines the fall in consumption and therefore, the loss in marginal utility, associated with 
it. Finally, increase in the term premium lowers the optimal level of  reserves that th
countries should hold. Just like any other form of insurance, the cheaper it is for a country to 
hold reserves as a cover against exogenous shocks, the greater is the optimal amount o
reserves it should hold, other things remaining constant. In terms of our model, the term 
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premium parameter determines the cost of carrying reserves in terms of reduced consum
before the shock. The higher the term premium, the bigger the cut in pre-shock consumpt
that the country has to take in order to finance higher consumption during the shock and 
therefore, lower the optimal level of reserves. 
 
 
ption 
ion 
Figure 10. Optimal Reserve Behavior—Two Good Model with both TOT and Aid 
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 1Optimal Reserves are expressed as a percentage of output. 
 
ves given by the Two-Good model 
 equal to 11 to 12 percent of total output. Thus, according to the Two-Good model, a typical 
 
For the benchmark parameters, the optimal level of reser
is
SSA country facing terms of trade and aid shock should hold foreign reserves equal to about 
11-12 percent of it’s G.D.P.  Figure 12 plots the actual level of reserves to GDP ratio for SSA 
countries at the end of year 2007 along with the optimal. We can see that while many SSA 
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countries had adequate or more than adequate reserves at the end of 2007 according to our 
model, there were a few whose reserve levels  were significantly below the benchmark 
optimal given by the same model. This may be a cause of concern since SSA countries are 
often subject to multiple shocks at the same time and holding reserves significantly belo
optimum can make them even more vulnerable to the possibility of economic crisis due to 
exogenous shocks.  
 
Figure 11. Optim
w the 
al Reserve Behavior—Two Good Model with both TOT and Aid 
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Figure 12. Actual Level of Reserves to GDP ratio for SSA countries 
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However, results based on average parameter values can be misleading if there is large 
ariation across countries. We therefore present sensitivity analysis and some country 
nsitivity Analysis. 
Figures 13 and 14 show t  reserves to the choice of some 
key parameters. As in the figure above, we plot the actual reserve to GDP ratio for SSA 
f 
 
e 
k 
hock 
e of 
v
specific results in the next two sections. 
 
D.   Se
he sensitivity of the level of optimal
countries at the end of year 2007 along with the optimal level determined by our model for 
alternative values of key parameters. The top column of Figure 11 shows the sensitivity o
optimal reserves to the size and probability of TOT shocks. The red line in the top right hand
figure of Figure 13 shows the optimal level of reserves if the average size of a terms of trad
shock is 2 percent while the blue line above it shows the optimal level of reserves when the 
size of terms of trade shocks is 40 percent. Clearly, the choice of probability parameter 
makes a significant difference in terms of determining whether a country has adequate 
reserves or not.  Same holds true for the size and output cost associated with a TOT shoc
and the size of term premium. Figure 14 presents similar exercise for the choice of aid s
parameters. Given that aid is only a small percentage of output, the results for optimal 
reserves are less sensitive to the choice of aid shock parameters. However, for countries with 
a much greater dependence on aid (either for consumption or for investment), the choic
optimal reserve level is likely to be more sensitive to the size, probability and output cost of 
aid shock. 
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Figure 13. Sensitivity of Optimal Reserves to Key Parameters/1 
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Sources: WEO and AFR Database. 
1The Graphs above show the sensitivity of optimal reserves to the size and probability of TOT shocks, 
output cost associated with them and the term premium. 
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Figure 14. Sensitivity of Optimal Reserves to Key Parameters1 
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Sources: WEO and AFR Database  
1The graphs above show the sensitivity of optimal reserves to the size and probability of Aid shocks 
and the output cost associated with them. 
 
 
E.   Country Specific Applications with Sensitivity Analysis 
The results above show that the choice of key parameters can affect the level of reserves that 
would be optimal for a particular country. In this section we use some country specific 
parameters alongside a few common parameters to obtain country specific estimates of 
optimal reserves for the SSA countries. We use data from 1980-2006 to estimate the 
probability of terms of trade and aid `shocks’ and the share of tradable goods in consumption 
(α ) for each of the 44 SSA countries. The probability of a `shock’ is simply the number of 
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shock events during 1980-2007 divided by the total number of years for each country 
whereas the share of tradable good is calculated by multiplying the share of consumption in 
domestic demand with the share of imports in total consumption. Term premium δ is set 
equal to 1.5 for all countries (same as that used for the emerging markets by Jeanne and 
Ranciere). Figure 15 below plots the level of actual reserves at the end of year 2007 against 
the optimal reserve level, as determined by our model, for SSA countries. Both, the actual 
and the optimal level of reserves are expressed as a ratio of GDP. 
 
The broken blue line is the 45 degree line which identifies countries holding an actual reserve 
level equal to the optimal for them. Countries to the right of this blue line hold more reserves 
than the optimal level indicated by our model. This can be due to several reasons – an un-
anticipated surge in price of oil or other major exports increasing the government revenues or 
domestic money supply (thereby forcing government to undertake sterilization operations) or 
excessive dependence on a non-renewable resource for export revenues (e.g. diamonds in 
Botswana) that is likely to be exhausted in foreseeable future.  
 
Countries to the left of the 45 degree line are those carrying fewer reserves than suggested by 
our model. A few of these, such as Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo seem to 
have reserve levels that are way below the optimal. Deciding upon the actual reasons and 
remedies for inadequate reserve accumulation requires us to look at each country separately.  
 
These results should be interpreted with caution. The simulations suggest that a few SSA 
countries do not currently carry reserves consistent with the expected output costs associated 
with expected terms-of-trade or aid shocks. But while the use of a small open economy two-
goods model allows us to simulate the optimal level of reserves across a broad spectrum of 
shocks and output costs, the “optimal level” of reserves is sensitive to the choice of key 
parameters such as the risk aversion, the term premium and the probability of shocks, and 
results in figure 15, which are illustrative, yield the results of model simulations for a given 
set of parameters.  
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Figure 15. Reserve Adequacy for African Countries Using Two-Good Model
CPV
KEN 
NGA 
SEN
SYC
AGO
BEN BFA 
BDI
CMR
CAF
CHD 
COM
COD
COG
CIV 
ETA
ETH 
GAB
GMB
GHAGIN
GNB
MDG
MWI MUS
MOZ
NMB
NER
STP
SLE
SAF 
SWZ 
TZA
TGO 
UGA 
ZMB
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Observed reserves-to-GDP ratio (2007)
O
pt
im
al
 re
se
rv
es
-to
-G
D
P 
ra
tio
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
tw
o-
go
od
 m
od
el
 
Sources: WEO and AFR database 
 
Figure 16 below illustrates the application of our model for assessing reserve behavior for 
individual countries, illustrated by a set of two countries. It plots the actual and `optimal’ 
level of reserves along with the ‘reserve gap’—all expressed as a percentage of GDP, for 
Angola and Congo, D.R.for the years 2000-07. 
 
The reserve gap is defined as the difference between optimal level of reserves, as suggested 
by our model and the actual level of reserves. We use a combination of country specific and 
common parameters to simulate optimal level of reserves for each country over time. In 
particular, the probability of aid and terms of trade shocks, ratio of short term debt to GDP 
and share of imports in consumption are country specific while the other parameters are 
common across countries. Of the country specific parameters, share of short term debt in 
GDP and that of imports in consumption are allowed to vary across time whereas the shock 
probabilities remain constant. 
 
Having thus calculated the level of optimal reserve as a share of output for each country we 
subtract the actual level of reserves, also expressed as a share of output., to obtain the reserve 
gap. The following main results emerge from this exercise: 
 
• The decline in the reserve gap is most significant for Angola, where the optimal level 
of reserves has declined in line with falling short term debt and the actual level of 
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reserves has increased owing to a windfall of oil revenues in recent years. As a result 
Angola has had more reserves than suggested by the two good model for the last two 
years, partly due to uncertainty about future oil revenues.  
• Congo, D.R. maintained a roughly constant level of reserve to GDP ratio (around 
2.5 percent) but saw an increase in the optimal level of reserves, with the reserve gap 
increasing by some 4 percent of GDP over the last 8 years. 
To summarize, assessing the adequacy of reserves held by a country requires us to look in to 
country specific factors affecting the reserve accumulation behavior. The two-good model, 
with exogenous terms of trade and aid shocks is a good starting point in this direction which 
can be built upon by using more country specific information on factors affecting reserve 
accumulation. 
Figure 16. Country Specific Application—Illustrative Examples 
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Source: WEO 
 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
Sustaining adequate level of reserves is a key policy consideration for SSA countries.  These 
countries continue to face risks arising from abrupt changes in the terms of trade and aid 
flows, which contribute to a higher volatility in aggregate output and, in extreme cases, to 
economic crisis. In this setting, maintaining adequate level of foreign reserves can be an 
important element in helping to reduce macroeconomic volatility, particularly so if there are 
no alternative sources of financing.  
The consumption smoothing role of reserves is particularly important in SSA countries as 
suggested by the preliminary empirical evidence presented in the paper. Countries with very 
low level of reserves are more strongly affected by exogenous shocks than the others. 
Assessing adequacy should therefore be informed by a country’s vulnerability to shocks, the 
magnitude of shocks, and the opportunity cost of holding reserves. Our model is a first step 
in the direction of developing a framework for reserve adequacy in SSA which takes in to 
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account this consumption smoothing role of reserves and compares the insurance value of 
foreign reserves in the event of exogenous shocks against their `carrying costs’.  
The use of a small open economy two-goods model allows us to simulate the optimal level of 
reserves across a broad spectrum of shocks and output costs, against which one can contrast 
actual holdings of SSA countries. It is clear that the “optimal level” of reserves is sensitive to 
the choice of key parameters such as the term premium and probability of shocks and 
therefore results based on average values of parameters can be misleading. We therefore use 
available country-specific information to obtain optimal reserve levels for SSA countries. 
The simulations suggest that a few SSA countries do not currently carry reserves consistent 
with the expected output costs associated with expected terms-of-trade or aid shocks.  
The Two-Good model provides us with a benchmark against which we can compare the 
actual reserve holdings of a country. To fully understand the reserve accumulation behavior 
of a country, however, one would also need to take into account other factors such as, for 
instance, the nature of its exchange rate regime, the degree of monetization. There is 
inevitably no one-size-fits-all level of reserves for all SSA countries. The actual choice of 
reserve levels to hold depends on a number of factors and should therefore be studied within 
the context of overall macroeconomic policy framework in a country.  
A few interesting extensions of the paper would include relaxing the restriction of no-saving-
in-terms-of non-tradable good and introducing capital accumulation and production in the 
economy. This simple model can also be extended to incorporate other shocks besides terms 
of trade and aid shocks. 
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Appendix 
 
Equation 1.20, 1.23 and 1.24 can be written as, 
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Using the expression for consumption aggregator in 1.22 we can write, 
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In the special case when there are no aid shocks we can rewrite the above equations using the 
expressions for tradable consumption given in equations 1.12-1.16 ,  
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Solving this expression for 1tR −  we can get the optimal level of reserves as a function of  pre-
shock tradable output and aid flow, 
 
1 1 , 2
T
t t b tR k Y k A− = × + ×   
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Table A1. Benchmark Parameters 
 
Parameters for Terms of Trade Shock Benchmark Value 
Size of the Shock,  0.219 TOTγ
Output loss due to the TOT shock, 1γ  0.015 
Coefficient of Risk Aversion, σ  2 
Share of Tradable, α  0.5 
Probability of  TOT Shock,  0.209 TOTπ
Term Premium, δ  0.015 
Potential Output Growth, g 0.05 
Risk free Rate of Return, r 0.05 
Short Term Debt as a Share of Output, λ  0.204 
Aid as a share of GDP 0.04 
Size of Aid Shock, Aidγ  1.81 
Output loss due to Aid shock, 2γ  0.015 
Probability of Aid Shock, Aidπ  0.10 
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Table A2. Simulation Parameters for Countries 
 
Probability TOT 
Shock
Probability Aid 
Shock
Share of Import 
in Consumption
Share of Short-Term 
Debt in Tradables
Angola              39.3 7.1 56.86 0.037
Benin 28.6 7.1 20.54 0.027
Botswana            25.0 21.4 37.73 0.350
Burkina Faso        25.0 3.6 22.16 0.021
Burundi             35.7 3.6 32.22 0.120
Cameroon            25.0 3.6 27.56 0.078
Cape Verde          28.6 3.6 41.55 0.118
Central African Rep. 17.9 3.6 20.74 0.279
Chad                17.9 3.6 50.00 0.000
Comoros 35.7 14.3 23.91 0.063
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 10.7 7.1 48.05 0.126
Congo, Republic of 17.9 21.4 101.79 0.032
Côte d'Ivoire       14.3 7.1 43.65 0.000
Equatorial Guinea   32.1 14.3 88.28 0.001
Eritrea 3.6 3.6 27.81 0.029
Ethiopia            28.6 7.1 27.01 0.019
Gabon               10.7 32.1 49.83 0.048
Gambia, The         17.9 10.7 44.83 0.293
Ghana               21.4 7.1 48.79 0.022
Guinea              17.9 10.7 30.82 0.083
Guinea-Bissau       21.4 14.3 41.59 0.194
Kenya               17.9 3.6 30.10 0.032
Lesotho             3.6 7.1 70.11 0.024
Madagascar 35.7 7.1 41.22 0.007
Malawi              25.0 7.1 33.45 0.025
Mali 17.9 3.6 31.59 0.032
Mauritius 3.6 28.6 64.69 0.022
Mozambique          14.3 7.1 41.76 0.151
Namibia             25.0 10.7 47.73 0.253
Niger               28.6 3.6 27.90 0.019
Nigeria             25.0 32.1 32.65 0.008
Rwanda              39.3 3.6 24.62 0.011
São Tomé & Príncipe 32.1 10.7 45.00 0.000
Senegal 10.7 7.1 36.37 0.019
Seychelles 39.3 25.0 117.34 0.074
Sierra Leone        3.6 14.3 26.38 0.074
South Africa        3.6 3.6 33.70 0.221
Swaziland           0.0 39.3 70.58 0.000
Tanzania            32.1 3.6 31.95 0.003
Togo                21.4 0.0 51.92 0.023
Uganda              35.7 7.1 26.80 0.012
Zambia 32.1 7.1 39.48 0.007
Average 21.5 10.4 42.51 0.094  
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